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Abstract: 
 
Small and medium-sized companies are extremely important for the Spanish 
economy. However, they face difficulties when trying to obtain financing (credit 
rationing). As a result, and given their limited possibilities to obtain finance in the 
capital market, they turn to the credit market, which is the main provider of funds for 
such companies. The main aim of this study is to provide an insight into the banking 
relationships that are developed in this market and their impact on credit rationing. 
Previous literature has studied this situation by focusing on price rationing and 
quantity rationing. This study furthers research into banking relationships by 
examining the effects that these relationships may have on compensation demanded 
for debt and the relationship with long-term credit rationing.  After studying 386 SMEs 
listed in the Spanish Guide of Exporting Companies, the main conclusions drawn were 
as follows: i) SMEs working with larger numbers of financial entities and with longer 
relationships with these entities enjoy better access to credit; ii) SMEs that develop 
banking relationships by contracting financial products manage to reduce their credit 
costs; iii) SMEs that have longer banking relationships with banking entities benefit 
from better long-term credit conditions; and iv) the maintenance of banking 
relationships through the rendering of services reduces bank requirements in terms of 
guarantees in credit applications. 
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1.- Introduction  
 
The financing of small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) has been attracting more 
and more interest among both European public authorities and academics, particularly 
in the case of Spain. Although little more than 500 companies access the capital 
market, more than 2,500,000 smaller-sized companies manage to finance their 
investment projects through financial intermediaries. 
 
The existence of financial markets - the main mechanism for valuing and controlling 
companies listed on the stock market – is the required reference framework in 
order to analyze financial business decisions. In the case of SMEs, the application of 
valuation methods becomes more complex insofar as there is no mechanism that 
reflects investors expectations. The functioning of the credit market and of the 
banking relationships developed therein is the first and almost only reference that can 
be used to determine the way in which fund providers value borrowers when granting, 
renewing or cancelling lines of credit. Banking relationships3 offer an insight into the 
financial behaviour of SMEs and financial entities, since these relationships condition 
major investment and growth decisions. The study of the main characteristics of 
banking relationships reveals the existence of problems of information asymmetries in 
this relationship, and which in turn lead inevitability to credit rationing. 
 
“Banking Relationships” (Boot, 2000) are defined as “the provision of financial 
services by a financial intermediary over time, enabling it to obtain specific, relevant 
and private information about the client, and evaluating the profitability of these 
types of investments”. Boot asks whether such relationships create value for both 
parties and, if they do, what the costs of these relationships are. 
 
This study attempts to answer certain questions regarding the credit market and 
aspects of the banking relationships that are developed therein. 
 
The characteristics of the banking relationship will depend, on the one hand, on: i) the 
characteristics of the company - its size, the number of financial entities with which it 
works, the duration of the banking relationship, the financial products contracted with 
the institution in question; and, on the other: ii) the characteristics of the financial 
market in which the SME operates. 
                                                          
3
 The term “banking relationship” is used as a synonym for “lending relationship”, a term that is 
insufficiently defined in the literature on banking intermediation.  
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 The importance of banking relationships may be determined by answering the 
following questions, namely: what strategies do firms adopt in order to obtain finance 
and avoid credit rationing?; must companies maintain long banking relationships with 
one or various credit institutions?; how does the number of credit entities with which a 
company works affect credit contracting terms and conditions (interest rates and 
collateral requirements)?; or, when attempting to obtain credit, how relevant is the 
contracting of other financial products such as direct crediting/debiting of salary 
payments or pension funds? 
 
The study of bank intermediation not only highlights the ability of financial entities to 
obtain information from credit applicants; it also reveals the great emphasis on the 
need to develop a banking relationship that goes beyond purely contractual 
relationships. Pioneering research in this field has been carried out by Petersen and 
Rajan (1994, 1995, 2002) and Berger and Udell (1995). Following these studies, 
researchers have gradually begun to examine the impact of banking relationships on 
SME financing in certain European countries such as Germany, Italy, Belgium and 
Portugal. 
 
In Spain, banking relationship studies have basically focused on large companies, 
analysing the impact of these relationships on the participation of banking groups in 
the capital of large firms, and vice versa, namely the presence of enterprises on 
boards of directors of financial entities. However, only a very small number of studies 
have discussed the relevance of the development of banking relationships in SME 
financing, despite the important contribution made by these types of enterprises to 
the Spanish economy.  
 
In the case of SMEs, research in Spain has focused on theoretical aspects of credit 
rationing (Freixas, 1991; Caminal, 1995;  López, Riaño and Romero, 1999), as well as 
on determining the structural factors of SME financing (Salas, 1996) and the use of 
guarantees in conditions of information asymmetry (Ramírez Comeig, 2003), among 
other aspects. Cardone, Longarela and Camino (1998) were the first to study the 
importance of banking relationships in the Spanish market. Variables such as 
company size and age, as well as the types of banking relationships they established 
with financial intermediaries, revealed certain effects on credit availability and credit 
costs. The present study aims to elaborate on the aspects addressed in this first 
study, since the latter only focused on one group of SMEs that are part of the Spanish 
reciprocal guarantee system. 
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 Recently Hernández (2004) published a study on banking relationships using data 
corresponding to 182 companies listed in the SME Economic Observatory of the 
Region of Murcia. The results offered by this author coincide with those reported for 
other financial markets in terms of the benefits of the duration of banking 
relationships (Belgium, Germany and Italy), namely that longer banking relationships 
increase the availability of credit but also raise its cost.  Another paper which studied 
a sample of 705 Spanish SMEs, analysed the determinants of the number of banks 
with which these firms worked. It showed that bigger enterprises, older companies 
and firms with higher leverage tend to request financing from a larger number of 
financial intermediaries. The explanation for this is as follows. As they grow, these 
companies become more complex and require more financial services; similarly, their 
exposure to more risks due to greater leverage prompts them to search for new 
lenders because they are normally rejected by institutions that are not willing to 
assume their risk. 
 
 
Following on from this introduction, Section 2 analyses the problems deriving from the 
presence of SMEs in credit markets. Section 3 describes the main field studies 
performed in different financial markets, including Spain. Section 4 presents the data 
and methodology used in this study. Section 5 offers and discusses the main 
conclusions. And finally, Section 6 presents the bibliographical references. 
 
2.- Effects of information asymmetries 
 
The existence of information asymmetries affects the behaviour of economic agents 
operating in the credit market, namely firms and financial institutions. The impact of 
these information asymmetries is stronger in the case of SMEs since these type of 
firms are unwilling to provide good quality information to lenders, and even less so 
when no regular control and valuation mechanisms are in place. The appearance of 
credit rating companies for SMEs in the very short term could reduce the problems of 
information asymmetries by introducing qualified information in the credit market. In 
fact, of the different theories that explain capital structure, Agency Theory is the one 
specifically based on the existence of information asymmetries in the credit market. 
 
SMEs approach the market with insufficient and poor quality information, which 
increases the number of information asymmetries with respect to existing ones, 
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although according to Norton (1991), these information differences will depend on 
the “stages or life cycle” of the company at a given moment4.  
 
The credit market begins to play a relevant role when companies realise that they are 
unable to access the capital market and when they are deterred by the high costs of 
obtaining information (in the early years of companies’ lives), coupled, as mentioned 
previously, with the lack of valuation mechanisms and incentives from analysts and 
credit rating companies.  
 
Conflicts of interests between firms and financial institutions and information 
asymmetries inevitably lead to credit rationing; this is when companies applying for 
financing are denied credit, even when they are willing to pay higher rates of interest 
for this credit. 
 
In the specific case of SMEs, it is the credit market that rations credit. Therefore, in 
addition to the penalties imposed due to the greater risk (Freixas, 1991), these 
firms may endure the following types of rationing: i) payment of higher effective 
interest rates as a consequence of the greater risk and analysis expenses in the 
operation (price rationing); ii) obtainment of fewer resources than those requested 
(quantity rationing); and in our opinion there is a third form of credit rationing; iii) 
the obtainment of very short-term financing (even if this has to be used to finance 
medium or long-term projects, which is achieved by periodical refinancing) (long-
term credit rationing). Considering the financial market as a whole, credit rationing 
may be understood as the rejection of a credit application. 
 
As regards financial institutions, once an optimum interest rate has been achieved, 
defined as the interest rate above which lenders’ profits will diminish, and after having 
rationed credit according to either the price or the amount of credit in the case of 
investment projects with different levels of risk, these will only finance projects that 
are less risky, broader in scope and longer in duration. When deciding whether to 
finance investment projects of equal profitability, they will consider the visible 
characteristics of the project (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1988).  
                                                          
4 Thus, during the i) growth stage, the financial markets (credit and capital) have little or no information 
about the SME. As a result, self-financing and very short-term indebtedness are the predominant sources of 
financing; ii) in the development stage, companies gradually consolidate their positions in both markets and 
the success or failure of their projects, as well as the fulfilment of their financial commitments, allow them to 
develop banking relationships with the financial institutions that provide them with access to the credit 
market in more advantageous conditions, forming capital structures based on longer term indebtedness; iii) 
in their maturity phase, companies access the capital market, and it is at this point that debenture issues, 
the development of projects through financial intermediaries and capital increases become important 
sources of financing. 
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 The effects of credit rationing may be partially resolved by improving and 
consolidating banking relationships. In this sense, credit institutions may reduce or 
partially eliminate information asymmetries and generate information on the borrower 
themselves. Thus, the interest rates and collateral requested by lenders diminish as 
the banking relationship matures and is consolidated. Interesting research is 
developing on this subject. The papers by Berger and Udell (1992 and 1995) and 
Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995 and 2003) offer relevant conclusions. These authors 
highlight three dimensions of the banking relationship: i) the duration of this 
relationship; ii) the amount of services received from a single financial institution; and 
iii) the concentration of loans with a single lender. According to these authors, the 
value of the banking relationship increases over time since the parties obtain more 
and more information on the debt contract, and at the same time the strength of this 
relationship reduces the effects of credit rationing.  
 
Thus, closer and longer banking relationships foster greater credit availability, 
although this is not always accompanied by a decrease in the price of money. 
According to Petersen and Rajan (1995), competition and long-term banking 
relationships are not always compatible. If the credit market is concentrated, financial 
intermediaries will be more willing to offer lower interest rates in order to reap future 
income from financed projects. However, when the market is more competitive, credit 
entities charge high interest rates, initially because the likelihood that the credit 
relationship will last longer and be consolidated diminishes, preventing them from 
sharing in expected future profits. This would partly explain why younger companies 
prefer internal financing over external sources of funds because the former is less 
costly than the latter in highly competitive and relatively unconcentrated credit 
markets. In the USA, younger companies receive larger volumes of bank financing in 
concentrated markets than companies in more competitive markets. This difference is 
reduced as companies mature. Similarly, the financing of investment projects is also 
conditioned by characteristics such as the size of the actual lender (Peek and 
Rosengren, 1995a, 1995b).  
 
Thakor (1996) analysed the effects of the increase in the number of banks with which 
firms work and discovered that the ex-ante probability of credit rationing increases 
due to the risk analysis costs that this entails. 
 
The most noteworthy benefits of banking relationships are basically:  
i) reduced information asymmetry;  
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ii)  higher interest rates, since these are offset by future interest rate reductions, 
as the transfer of information between the lender and the borrower gains 
momentum. This is relevant whenever the confidentiality of the data transmitted 
by the former to the latter is guaranteed (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995)5. In 
turn, the lender is motivated to invest in the search for information on the 
borrower since this enables the relationship to be maintained in the future (re-
usage). 
Firms that are initially unknown in the market, particularly young and small 
companies, are penalised by being forced to bear higher interest rates than those 
that they would normally be expected to pay (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Boot and 
Thakor, 1994), but which would be compensated in the future with interest rates 
below market rates. At the same time, banks are willing to charge lower interest 
rates at the beginning of a banking relationship if they believe they will obtain high 
cash flows in the future. 
 
iii) banking relationships improve the terms and conditions of credit contracts; these 
become more complete due to greater flexibility for taking decisions based on “soft” 
information (non-verifiable or non-observable). 
 
The main cost of the banking relationship is basically the fact that the borrower 
becomes informationally captured. Sometimes firms do not change bank, not because 
they feel particularly well treated but because the lending institution has information 
that it could share with a future client who is a competitor of the “captured” company. 
This hold-up problem was first recognized by Sharpe (1990). 
 
3.- Banking relationships and previous research studies 
 
The field studies performed in different types of financial markets coincide in 
determining that the consolidation of banking relationships helps to increase the 
availability of credit for applicants, and avoids credit rationing. Whenever results do 
not coincide and diverse results are obtained, this is due to the effect of the banking 
relationship on the terms and conditions of the credit contract (interest rate and 
collateral requirements). Thus, while the studies performed with companies in the 
USA conclude that banking relationships improve credit conditions because enterprises 
obtain lower interest rates and are asked to present fewer guarantees, opposite 
conclusions have been reached in studies performed in European countries. The 
                                                          
5
 Innovative companies prefer to go into debt before approaching the capital market in order not to disclose 
information. 
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information obtained by the credit institution by virtue of the banking relationship 
worsens the conditions of the loan instead of improving them, i.e. higher interest 
rates are charged and more guarantees are requested. This is due to the different 
characteristics of the financial systems in countries with market-based systems, such 
as the Anglo-Saxon model (USA and United Kingdom), and countries whose systems 
are based on banking intermediation or the continental model (Germany, France, 
Spain, Belgium and Italy). As a result, companies in these countries have fewer 
financing alternatives and must therefore yield to the discipline of the banks. 
 
Previous research has analysed the impact of the duration and scope (number of 
financial services that link the parties) of banking relationships, and subsequently the 
changes presented in the competitive environment of the European market, such as 
de-regulatory processes, and merger and takeover processes. In this connection, 
Berger et al. (1998) analysed the impact of mergers and acquisitions in the banking 
sector on credit to SMEs. According to these authors, although mergers reduce 
bank loans, this effect is generally compensated by the reaction of other banks. 
Sapienza (2002) confirms this effect of mergers. This author noted that when banks 
grow, they reduce the credit they award to small borrowers and subsequently 
banking relationships between these institutions and their clients change. Salas and 
Saurina (2003) analysed the determinants that influence the number of financial 
entities with which these enterprises work and the effect that these have on credit 
availability (rationing) and debt terms and conditions (interest rate and guarantees 
requested). These findings seem to suggest that companies have to work with only 
one bank in order to maximise fund availability, and at most with two banks so that 
the original lender loses the monopoly, thus enabling the SME to achieve better credit 
conditions6. 
 
Japan 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990, 1991) demonstrated that investment by firms 
with close bank relationships appears to be less liquidity constrained than investment 
by firms without close bank ties. They interpreted this finding as evidence that bank 
ties tend to mitigate information problems in the capital market.  They also focused on  
the investment behaviour of firms that have recently weakened their bank ties in 
favour of greater reliance on the bond market. Their results suggest that these firms 
                                                          
6 The non-uniform behaviour of SMEs in Europe (they tend to work with a large number of financial 
entities) may be explained by: i) company size; ii) lack of co-ordination on the part of banks; iii) the 
credit rating of the SME; iv) diversification of the banking relationship; v) level of indebtedness of the 
SME; vi) age of the SME; vii) size of the bank; viii) banks and securities markets (Hernández, 2004). In 
our opinion, other relevant factors include the sector in which the SME operates and whether or not the 
firm belongs to a family group. 
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are now more liquidity constrained. They provide a discussion of why firms would 
loosen their bank ties in light of these liquidity costs. They argue that monitoring and 
other costs associated with bank finance must be large. 
 
United States: 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) analysed the North American market and the effect on 
credit availability (rationing of the amount of credit) and interest rates charged (price 
rationing) on: i) the duration of the banking relationship measured over the number of 
years that both entities have worked together; and ii) the amplitude/scope of this 
banking relationship, measured according to the number of financial services 
demanded/offered by both parties7.  
 
The number of financial entities with which a company works is another aspect to be 
analysed within banking relationships8. Petersen and Rajan (1994) found that firms 
working with more banks had to bear higher interest rates and had greater access to 
funds. The reason for this relationship is explained by the fact that: i) supervision 
costs increase; and ii) the market considers that if a company has more banking 
relationships, this is due to its low credit rating; as a result, and given the banks’ 
refusal to provide financing, the firm in question must seek funds from other financial 
institutions. 
 
In a later study, Petersen and Rajan (1995) analysed the relationship between the 
benefits of banking relationships and the level of competitiveness of the banking 
sector. They concluded that credit availability was directly related to the market power 
of banks and also to the duration of banking relationships and inversely proportional 
to the number of banks with which companies worked.  
 
Berger and Udell (1995) studied the duration of banking relationships in order to 
determine whether this had an inversely proportional effect on interest rates and 
                                                          
7 According to Boot and Thakor (1994), the banking relationship directly influences the level of rationing 
to which the company is exposed. The authors demonstrate that credit availability increases with the 
“market power of the bank” and the longer the duration of the banking relationship, but decreases when 
companies begin to work with more banks. These measures (duration and scope) have a positive 
influence on credit availability but have no effect on interest rates. 
 
8 According to Diamond (1984), the optimal decision is it to borrow from only one bank in order to avoid cost 
duplication. At the same time, the lender has more incentives to supervise. If the provision of funds is 
shared with another bank, supervision must be shared and this is not something that banks are interested 
in.  However, from the standpoint of the firm, the fact that the FE (financial entity) has private information in 
its possession means that competition is fostered between lenders and borrowers enjoy greater flexibility 
when  changing of financial intermediary. 
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guarantees requested. They find that banks tend to charge lower interest rates and 
request fewer guarantees if they receive more information from the borrower.  
  
According to Thakor (1996), working with a large number of banks may increase the 
ex-post probability of access to credit. Inversely, ex–ante, it would seem that credit 
entities are not willing to invest time and money in analysing the risks that this would 
entail. 
 
Cole (1998), using the same database as the abovementioned authors, analysed the 
effect of the duration of banking relationships on credit availability and reached the 
conclusion that the duration of banking relationships was directly proportional to credit 
availability and inversely proportional to the number of credit entities with which 
companies worked. 
 
As regards the number of financial entities with which companies work, studies 
focusing on the American market seem to conclude that the value of banking 
relationships increases as the number of entities financing companies from this 
market decreases.  
 
Italy: 
Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998) studied a sample of Italian companies. Their main 
conclusions were that companies that manage to maintain longer banking 
relationships eventually end up paying higher interest rates. These results contrast 
with those described previously and can be explained by the fact that banks exploit 
their informational monopoly (“hold up”) by charging higher interest rates because 
they have more information about the company. 
 
In terms of the number of financial entities, these authors reported that Italian 
companies working with fewer financial entities achieved better credit availability but 
bore higher interest rates. Evidently banks concentrate more privileged information, 
and at the same time take away negotiating power from companies with other 
lenders. 
 
D´Auria, Foglia and Marullo-Reedtz (1999) described the wide variety of banking 
relationships maintained by Italian SMEs. This market is based on a continental-type 
financial system, characterised by the existence of many small financial entities which 
are subject to a limited concentration of risks and specialisation of financial products. 
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These are the main reasons why Italian SMEs obtain funds from many different 
providers. 
 
Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000) analysed the factors that determine the 
number of financial entities with which SMEs do business. The main findings may be 
analysed: i) from the standpoint of the financial systems implemented in Italy; and ii) 
according to the characteristics of the SMEs themselves. Thus, firms tend to work with 
only one bank i) when: 1) they establish relationships with smaller banks; 2) there is 
a high probability that these banks will become insolvent; or 3) countries have 
efficient bankruptcy regulation systems; and SMEs tend to establish relationships with 
only one bank ii) when: 1) they are very small; and when 2) they develop very 
profitable projects. 
 
Germany 
Harhöff and Körting (1998) studied the German market and confirmed the results 
reported by Cole (1998) in relation to the impact of the number of banks with which 
companies work.  
 
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) considered the condition of the figure of the main financing 
bank. According to these authors, this bank is also a liquidity provider, in case the 
company suffers a financial crisis. Although the main liquidity provider does not 
charge interest rates above those offered by other financing providers, it does provide 
liquidity if the SME experiences financial problems. The relationship that develops 
between the main bank and SMEs, based on mutual trust, consists of the bank 
requesting fewer guarantees and offering lower interest rates and the company being 
more willing to supply information; these results were also confirmed by Harhöff and 
Körting (1998) and by Lehmann and Neuberger (2001). 
 
As regards the effect on loan conditions, these authors found that German enterprises 
working with fewer banks had greater access to credit and were asked to present 
fewer guarantees by banking institutions. The interest rate was not affected by the 
number of banks with which the company worked. 
 
A very important contribution was made by Lehmann and Neuberger (2001); these 
authors analysed banking relationships from the viewpoint of banks - in their capacity 
as lenders - and not from the perspective of borrowers, as in the case of the studies 
described previously. The survey was performed among managers of financial 
institutions. They found that the perception of the financial institution was that there 
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is no possibility of obtaining credit and requesting guarantees during the first two 
years of the banking relationship. 
 
Germany is clearly a country in which SMEs tend to concentrate and develop good 
banking relationships, and reap benefits by consolidating these relationships. 
 
Belgium 
The work performed by Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) is currently the field study 
that has examined the largest number of companies. These authors concluded that 
companies that had longer (duration) banking relationships were charged higher 
interest rates by financial institutions, and companies that contracted a broader range 
of the financial products benefited from reduced costs in financial operations, at the 
same time as financial intermediaries requested more guarantees, given the larger 
amount of information available to them. 
 
De Bodt, Lobez and Statnik (2001) focused on the relationship existing between the 
number of financial entities working with firms and credit rationing. They analysed 
how SMEs should analyse their relationships with banks, i.e. how they should 
determine on the number of banks with which to work, what types of institutions they 
should choose as their main suppliers, etc. This study provided a direct measurement 
of credit rationing, or at least how this was perceived by SMEs. These authors 
confirmed the existence of credit rationing in the Belgian market and of a positive 
relationship between credit availability and banking relationship, where the duration of 
banking relationships was a fundamental aspect of credit availability. 
 
One of their main conclusions drawn by these authors was that Belgian SMEs did not 
adopt specific strategies when choosing the number of financial entities with which 
they wished to work, and that this decision basically depended on the type of main 
financial institutions with which they operated and on the size of the SME in question, 
which is related to the information they provide to financing entities (smaller SMEs 
tend to work with more institutions in order not to suffer credit rationing, whereas 
larger SMEs normally concentrate on small numbers of financial institutions, mainly 
local ones, with which they work in order to reduce the probability of rationing). The 
characteristics of the Belgian market are somewhere between the concentration found 
in Germany and the dispersion displayed in Italy. 
 
Europe 
Ongena and Smith (2000) analysed the behaviour of companies from different 
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European countries when optimising the number of banks from which to request 
financing. In Mediterranean countries (countries from southern Europe), enterprises 
sometimes work with up to 15 financial entities, whereas companies in northern 
European countries tend to concentrate their debts with a single bank. The number of 
financial institutions used by these companies is determined by the characteristics of 
the financial system (greater fragility, fewer financial entities), the existing legal 
framework, the size of the companies and their levels of debt. 
 
Portugal 
Farinha and Santos (2002) analysed the determining factors that prompt Portuguese 
companies to increase the number of financial entities with which they work. These 
factors included: the duration of the company’s banking relationship with a single 
bank; the size of the company; and its growth opportunities. These determining 
factors were positively related with banking relationships. 
 
Spain 
In Spain very few studies have been performed in this field. One of the most 
important reasons is that until recently available databases did not have the 
information necessary to undertake research of these characteristics9.  
 
Cardone et al. (1998) studied this issue by performing a survey among a group of 
companies whose data were provided by “SGRs” (Sociedades de Garantía Recíproca – 
(RGCs) Reciprocal Guarantee Companies)10 11. The contribution of this study consisted 
in the analysis of the financial situation of SMEs as a function of age; the duration 
of the banking relationship and the mediation or non-mediation of financial 
intermediaries in the credit market, as is the case of RGCs (Sociedades de Garantía 
Recíproca – Reciprocal Guarantee Companies). The study had two objectives: i) to 
study the importance of the age of the companies, the duration of the banking 
relationship and the mediation of RGCs as factors that help to reduce information 
                                                          
9 The databases that have traditionally been used are the following: the Financial Information Office of the 
Bank of Spain; the National Statistical Survey; the Survey on Business Strategies (ESEE); data from the 
Fundación Empresa Pública and Ministry of Industry and Energy; the database of the Institute of Tax 
Studies, and the SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances de Empresas Ibérico – Iberian Company Balance 
Sheet Analysis System). These hardly have the necessary information to perform an analysis of banking 
relationships. The SABI only has details of the number of financial entities with which SMEs work. 
 
10 Of the 189 valid responses received, 12 companies were not endorsed by an RGC; 55 companies had 
a guarantee in force at the time of the survey; 2 had never requested any guarantees; the rest - 120 
companies - could not be identified.  
 
11In Spain around 40,200 SMEs access the credit market through the reciprocal guarantee system 
(Cardone, 1995), hence the company the object of study fulfilled two criteria: (i) it was an SME; and (ii) it 
had accessed, or not accessed, either in the past or at present, the credit market with the financial 
endorsement of an RGC.  
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asymmetry existing in debt contracts; and ii) to study whether these factors were 
among the determinants of the debt costs borne by SMEs. 
 
The results confirmed that the duration of banking relationships and the mediation of 
financial intermediaries (providers of guarantees in this case) were factors that only 
enhanced credit availability but did not reduce debt costs. 
  
The most noteworthy conclusions were that companies valued banking relationship 
insofar as, even when working with various financial institutions, they continued to 
maintain strong links with the entities with which they first established contacts. 
The authors found that the duration of the banking relationship was not a priority 
factor for financial entities when awarding credit. The mediation of an RGC was 
valued more by micro and small young companies.  
 
For summary purposes, Table I below presents the main studies published and 
commented above. 
 
 
Table I: Empirical evidence of bank relationships in the USA and Europe 
Country Authors No. of companies Database Main Conclusions 
JAPAN Hoshi, Kashyap 
and Scharfstein 
(1990, 1991) 
  Investment by firms with close 
bank relationships appears to be 
less liquidity constrained than 
investment by firms without close 
bank ties. 
Petersen and 
Rajan (1994) 
3.404 SMEs 1988-89 
NSSBF  
National Survey of 
Small Business 
Finance 
The duration and scope of banking 
relationships is directly 
proportional to credit availability, 
but this does not affect interest 
rates. 
SMEs working with more banks 
bear higher interest rates and 
benefit from greater credit 
availability. 
Berger and Udell 
(1995) 
3.404 SMEs NSSBF The duration of the banking 
relationship is inversely 
proportional to interest rates and 
guarantees requested. 
USA 
  
Cole (1998) 5.356 SMEs 1993 
NSSBF 
The duration of banking 
relationships is directly 
proportional to credit availability, 
and inversely proportional to the 
number of credit entities with 
which the SMEs work. 
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Angelini, Di Salvo 
and Ferri (1998) 
6.164 SMEs 1995 
Central Credit 
Register 
Long banking relationships lead, 
over time, to the payment of 
higher interest rates. 
SMEs working with fewer banks 
enjoy greater credit availability 
and higher interest rates.  
ITALY 
Detragiache, 
Garella and Guiso 
(2000) 
 
1.849 SMEs Survey of 
Manufacturing Firms 
Determinants of the number of 
financial entities with which SMEs 
work. 
Harhoff and 
Körting (1998) 
1.509 SMEs 1997 Long banking relationships lead, 
over time, to the  provision of 
fewer guarantees. 
SMEs working with fewer banks 
enjoy greater credit availability and 
are asked to provide fewer 
guarantees. Interest rates are not 
affected by the number of banks. 
Elsas and 
Krahnen (1998) 
92  SMEs Loans granted from 
1992 to 1997 by 
financial entities 
The duration of banking 
relationships is not relevant when 
pricing credit. What is relevant is 
not the duration but the intensity 
of the banking relationships. 
GERMANY 
Lehmann and 
Neuberger (2001) 
1.200 Financial entities 1997 
Survey on financial 
entities 
Perception of the financial 
institution: no possibility of 
obtaining credit and requesting 
guarantees during the first 2 years 
of the banking relationship.  
Degryse and Van 
Cayseele (2000) 
17.429 SMEs 1997 
Analysis of the 
conditions of granted 
loans  
Longer banking relationships are 
accompanied by higher interest 
rates. 
Greater scope entails lower 
interest rate.  
BELGIUM 
Bodt, Lobez and 
Statnik (2001) 
296 SMEs 1998 
Survey 
Longer banking relationships afford 
greater credit availability. 
The effect of the number of banks 
depends on the size of the lender 
and of the borrower. 
PORTUGAL Farinha and 
Santos (2002) 
1.577 SMEs 1996 Most companies initially request 
resources from only one bank. 
With time banking relationships 
begin to diversify. 
Cardone, 
Longarela and 
Camino (1998) 
189 SMEs 1996 
Survey of Companies 
from the Reciprocal 
Guarantees System 
The duration of banking 
relationships, as well as the 
mediation of financial 
intermediaries, only facilitate credit 
availability but do not reduce debt 
costs. 
Hernández, G. 
(2004) 
184 SMEs  2000 
SME Economic 
Observatory of 
Murcia and SABI 
banking relationships increase 
credit availability  and costs. 
 
 
SPAIN 
Hernández, G. 
(2004) 
705 SMEs  2000 
SME Economic 
Observatory of 
Murcia and SABI 
Analyses the determinants of the 
number of banks. The largest, 
oldest and most leveraged 
companies tend to work with more 
financial institutions. 
EUROPE Ongena AND 
Smith (2000) 
1079  SMEs 1996 
Survey of financial 
managers from 20 
European countries 
These authors analysed whether 
multiple banking relationships 
replaced relatively undeveloped 
securities markets. This hypothesis 
was not compared. 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors 
 
4.- Data and methodology 
 
The empirical study of banking relationships in Spain was performed by 
constructing a database developed from a questionnaire on 13,200 Spanish 
companies. This questionnaire was sent by Internet to companies listed in the 
"Spanish Guide of Exporting Companies". The data requested from SMEs referred to 
31/12/99 since the questionnaires were sent out during the first quarter of 2000. 
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The number of valid questionnaires received totalled 410, which represented 3.1% 
of the total number of companies surveyed. Of these 410 companies, 386 were 
eventually selected after applying filters to verify the quality of the variables, 
eliminating those that failed to offer correct measures or lost values in variables 
that were relevant for the purposes of the study. 
 
The questionnaire consisted of 28 questions and was divided into three blocks: 
i) Block I contained information on the company (size, sector, age, legal 
form, ownership, address, data on composition of the balance sheets 
(assets and financial structure).  
ii) Block II included questions relating directly to the banking relationship of 
each SME: number of credit entities with which the SME worked, 
maximum percentage of debt requested from a credit entity, duration of 
the banking relationship with the two main institutions with which it 
works, interest rates on short and long-term operations, types of 
relationships that the SME maintained with credit entities and their 
importance, and loyalty in the relationship.  
iii) Block III contained questions relating to guarantees and compensation 
associated with loans: type of compensation, types of guarantees, 
reasons for requesting guarantees, requested guarantee-loan ratio, and 
reasons why the loan was refused, if this were the case. 
 
The final sample of SMEs was divided into three groups according to company size: 
microcompanies (less than 10 employees), small companies (between 10 and 49 
employees), and medium-sized companies (between 50 and 249 employees). The 
distribution of the sample according to company size was 37.31%, 46.63% and 
16.06%, respectively. In the same way the sectorial representation of SMEs was 
widely distributed among the following sectors (without forgetting that all of them 
are exporters, given the basis taken as reference): Services (37,80%), Industry 
(27,82%), Wholesale (11,81%), Retail (10,76%), Construction (8,14%) and 
Primary and other (3,68%). 
 
In terms of the legal form of the SMEs in the sample, these were mainly Limited 
Liability Companies (40%), Joint Stock Companies (39.74%) and Sole 
Proprietorships (12.37%). Other legal forms present in lower proportions included 
Workers’ Cooperatives (2.37%) and Labour Cooperatives (1.87%). 
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The empirical study is divided into two parts. The first part consists of a descriptive 
analysis of the characteristics of banking relationships in Spain among SMEs. The 
second part describes an econometric study that enabled us to analyse the 
existence and determinants of credit rationing affecting mainly SMEs. The 
continental system is geared towards banking and is predominant in continental 
Europe and it served as a reference framework for this analysis; Spain is an 
example of such a system. Hence, given the reduced number of studies of this type 
that have focused specifically on the situation in Spain, the conclusions drawn from 
this research make important contributions to the reference literature.  
 
4.1. Description of banking relationships in the case of Spanish SMEs. 
 
Banking relationships are of special interest in the case of Spanish companies, 
given the importance of the credit market in the continental system. Furthermore, 
this is particularly relevant in the case of SMEs because these types of enterprises 
are burdened by strong limitations in terms of access to external financing, or the 
different types of credit rationing mentioned previously.  
 
This section presents a descriptive study of the main characteristics of banking 
relationships and the different classes of conditions of credit contracts and 
guarantees requested by financial institutions. 
 
a. Characteristics of banking relationships 
 
Tables II and III present the statistics associated with banking relationship 
variables. In addition to the duration and length of the relationship, both widely 
considered in the literature, we have included another series of relevant 
characteristics associated with them. Thus, we analysed the maximum level of 
concentration of bank debt with a single financial entity, the importance of the 
relationships maintained by companies with the two main credit entities that they 
work with and the loyalty of companies towards credit institutions.   
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Table II: Description of banking relationships by company size 
 MICROCOMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM-SIZED 
COMPANIES 
No. of financial entities 
with which the company 
works 
2.81 
(2) 
4.57 
(4) 
6.35 
(5) 
Maximum % requested 
from a single entity 
57.58% 
(60%) 
 
42.11% 
(40%) 
44.84% 
(40%) 
Duration of the 
relationship with the two 
main entities (a1 and 
a2) 
3 to 5 years 
 
3 to 5 years 
6 to 10 years 
 
3 to 5 years 
6 to 10 years 
 
6 to 10 years 
Specialisation in operations with credit entities (Loyalty, %) 
Current account 
advances 
21.74 14.93 - 
Document discounts 43.5 32.8 18.2 
Credit Line 59.42 53.7 27.3 
Mortgage Operations 26.09 28.4 54.5 
Other operations 7.25 16.42 18.2 
1 Mean values for each SME according to size. The average appears in brackets. 
 
As regards the number of financial entities with which SMEs work, Table II shows 
that larger SMEs work with more financial institutions because they contract wider 
ranges of services and because of their stronger negotiating capacity. In line with 
these results, this table also shows that the maximum concentration of bank debt 
with a single entity was higher in the case of microcompanies, since these types of 
enterprises establish relationships with smaller numbers of financial entities. 
However, the duration of banking relationships between SMEs and banks are 
consolidated as company size increases; microcompanies maintain shorter 
relationships - on average between 3 and 5 years - and medium-sized companies 
the longest relationships – more than 10 years. 
 
As regards the types of banking relationships that they maintain with banks, Table 
III shows the mean importance of these relationships with the two main 
institutions, measured on a scale of 1 to 5. From these results we may conclude 
that the main types of relationships that SMEs establish with the main financial 
institution are through current accounts, lines of credit and commercial discounts, 
whereas the most noteworthy relationships with second entities are developed in 
connection with current accounts. Also related to the foregoing is the loyalty of 
SMEs according to their size; interestingly Table II shows how microcompanies and 
small enterprises are mainly loyal in relation to document discounts and lines of 
credit, whereas medium-sized companies display loyalty to financial institutions 
through the execution of mortgage-type operations. These results also reveal the 
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types of financing of each type of company, which is more short-term for smaller 
companies. However, in the case of medium-sized companies we observed that the 
operations were broader in scope and longer term. 
 
Table III: Mean importance of banking relationships with the 2 main credit 
institutions with which the company operates (measured on a scale of  1 - least important 
- to 5 - most important) 
 
Order of 
importante 
Current 
account  
Commercial 
Discount 
Savings 
account     
Direct 
crediting/de
biting of 
salaries 
Line of 
credit    
Participation 
of the entity 
in the SME’s 
capital stock 
Other: 
Specify 
                   
Entity 1 3.16   2.19   0.58   1.72   2.5   0.13   0.34   
Entity 2 2.25   1.55   0.36   0.62   1.5   0.10   0.23   
 
b. Types of guarantees and compensation: Causes 
 
Table IV presents details of the different characteristics associated with guarantee 
requests, causes and types, as well as other types of additional conditions for 
contracts, all distributed according to company size. 
 
Around 70% of all SMEs are asked to present guarantees. Of these companies, the 
enterprises that are most often asked to fulfil this requirement are microcompanies 
(of the total number of microcompanies in the sample, 85% were asked to present 
guarantees, compared with 51% of medium-sized companies). Microcompanies 
were mainly asked to present guarantees due to the volume of debt requested, the 
term or repayment period and the risk associated with the viability of the projects. 
In the case of small and medium-sized companies, guarantees were basically 
requested due to volume of debt requested and then the associated risk level. 
In terms of the types of guarantees requested, it is worth noting that 
microcompanies are mainly required to present guarantees that are not related to 
the main line of activity, personal guarantees being the most important types of 
collateral, probably due to the lack of volume. Small companies mainly present 
personal guarantees. And, lastly, medium-sized companies are required to present 
real guarantees associated with their main line of business, followed by non-related 
personal guarantees. Therefore, these results confirmed the overall importance of 
personal guarantees in SMEs. It is more common for real guarantees to be 
requested from larger companies, given their higher level of complexity and the 
association of performance with their investment projects. 
 
 
 19
Table IV: Guarantees 
 
 MICROCOMPANIES SMALL 
COMPANIES 
MEDIUM-SIZED 
COMPANIES 
Request for 
Guarantees (69.4%) 
85.16% 65.06% 50.85% 
Factors determining the request for guarantees (Level of importance on a scale of 0 to 5, 
followed by the percentages in which the higher value appears) 
Amount of the loan 5/54.2 5/61.6 5/55.6 
Duration of the 
relationship with the 
financial institution 
4/19.6 1/13.3 2/13.8 
Viability of the project 
for which financing has 
been requested 
5/13.08 4/10.8 3-5/13.8 
Operations of less than 
12 months 
2/10.3 1/10.83 1/19.4 
Operations of between 1 
and 3 years 
5/12.15 1/10.8 2/13.8 
Operations of more than 
3 years 
5/16.8 3/8.3 3/11.4 
Other 5/4.67 5/9.3 5/8.3 
TYPES OF GUARANTEES REQUESTED (%) 
Personal  NOT related to 
the activity of the 
business 
(56.37%) 
68.6 54.5 29.7 
Peresonal, related to the 
activity of the business 
(20.36%) 
17.9 25.41 13.5 
Real, NOT related to the 
main line of business 
(17.95%) 
20.54 15 16.2 
Real, related to the main 
line of business 
(19.78%) 
15.18 20.83 32.43 
 
As shown in Table V, there do not seem to be any differences in the relationship 
between guarantees requested and loan volume according to the size of the 
company, the relationships of 100% and 101% to 200% being the most common. 
Additional compensation corresponded mainly to the opening of current accounts 
and other types of operations, in which we may include insurance and other 
financial products, for microcompanies and small companies. For medium-sized 
companies, the direct crediting/debiting of salary payments and current accounts 
were the most requested forms of compensation. Also noteworthy was the fact that 
the direct crediting/debiting of salary payments acquired greater relevance in larger 
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companies, given the larger number of employees and therefore the inferred 
business opportunities that this situation offers to financial institutions. 
 
Table V: Guarantee/loan ratio and compensation 
 
 MICROCOMPANIES SMALL 
COMPANIES 
MEDIUM-SIZED 
COMPANIES 
Guarantee/loan ratio 
Less than 100% of 
the loan 
10.48 11.71 14.71 
100% 37.14 21.62 26.47 
101/200% 23.8 25.23 20.59 
201/300% 10.5 7.21 2.94 
301/400% 4.76 11.71 8.82 
401/600% 3.81 1.8 2.94 
More than 600% 2.86 6.31 2.94 
TYPES OFCOMPENSATION (%) 
Opening of Current 
account (57.74%) 
63.49 56.52 43.3 
Opening of Savings 
account (19.76%) 
16.13 26.09 16.67 
Direct 
crediting/debiting of 
salary payments 
(32.14%) 
28.57 31.8 43.3 
Some type of 
compensation 
55.75 53.03 61.22 
 
c. Problems of financing: causes of the rejection of loans 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this study, SMEs, due to their opacity and high 
concentration of risks, are subjected to greater credit rationing. In this connection, 
Table VI presents the percentages of the different types of SMEs that are refused 
credit, as well as the main causes of credit denial. As can be seen, the failure to 
present guarantees accounts for the rejection of credit requests presented by 
27.5% of microcompanies, 24% of small companies and 20% of medium-sized 
companies; at the same time, financing becomes more costly and is more 
pronounced in the case of microcompanies (9.81%). However, the presentation of 
collateral is no guarantee that a loan will be awarded or that a discount will be 
made on the cost of the credit. Thus, 37.27% of microcompanies that presented 
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guarantees were not awarded the credit (this percentage diminishes as company 
size increases).   
 
As regards the causes of rejection of loan applications, even when guarantees are 
presented it was noted that loan applications were generally rejected because of 
the non-feasibility of the project, together with other causes (such as the risk of 
non-payment). 
 
Table VI: Negotiation of credit and causes 
 
 MICROCOMPANIES SMALL 
COMPANIES 
MEDIUM-SIZED 
COMPANIES 
Credit is not awarded if 
no guarantees are 
presented 
27.52 24.81 20 
Loan costs increase if 
no guarantees are 
presented 
9.81 3.67 7.21 
Credit is refused even 
when guarantees are 
presented 
37.27 27.14 22 
Causes of rejection of credit requests even when guarantees are presented 
Non-viability of the 
project 
33.3 30.3 27.3 
Because the request has 
been rejected by 
another credit entity 
18.2 6.2 9 
Because the company 
does not have a 
relationship with the 
credit entity 
27.3 15.6 18.8 
Other causes 33.3 50 54.5 
 
4.2. Determinants of credit rationality: an econometric study. 
 
Literature on banking relationships describes credit rationing as one of the main 
problems faced by SMEs. As a result, they are unable to take on attractive projects 
and have to deal with problems that affect their growth and expansion, among 
other difficulties. Given this scenario, we decided to examine the causes of this 
situation and the possible strategies that companies could adopt to minimise it, 
through the banking relationships that they maintain with financial institutions.  
 
Credit rationing may be perceived in different types of situations. Thus, this 
situation has traditionally been identified when companies cannot obtain credit. 
However, there are other circumstances in which companies have to deal with a 
problem of credit rationing even when they have been awarded credit. The most 
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important problems arise: when they obtain less financing than the amount initially 
requested (rationing of the amount of credit); when the cost of the credit they 
receive is higher than the market cost of credit (price rationing); when they achieve 
financing for a shorter term than expected (rationing of the term of credit); and 
when the amount of the collateral that they present is greater than the amount of 
the loan (rationing of credit conditions and guarantees). Previous studies in the 
literature have addressed these problems by focusing mainly on the two first forms 
of rationing described above, and at the same time they have considered the 
conditions of debt with respect to guarantee requests. In our research, we also 
studied the effects on compensation demanded in return for debt and the 
relationship with long-term credit rationing. 
 
In this section we will focus on the effect that the characteristics associated with 
banking relationships may have on these types of rationing and the extent to which 
they may contribute to their minimisation. For this purpose we present the 
following general model: 
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where RCin is the set of proxy variables used to determine the different types of 
credit rationing; RBij corresponds to the different factors that explain this rationing 
and which are associated with the banking relationship. We also included other 
control variables VCm (size, age, financial structure, rotation of assets) and 
controlled the possible sectorial effects represented by sectorial dummies DSECj. 
 
Tables VII and VIII present the definitions of the dependent proxy variables of 
credit rationing and the explanatory variables used in the estimations of the 
different models, respectively. 
Table VII: Dependent variables: types of credit rationing 
FEDC Percentage of financing that the company maintains with credit institutions with 
respect to total liabilities. 
COSTECP Cost of short-term financing, measured at the nominal interest rate. 
COSTELP Cost of long-term financing, measured at the nominal interest rate. 
PLAZO Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 if the percentage of long-term financing with 
respect to total resources is greater than, or equal to, the percentage of short-term 
financing; otherwise its value is 0. 
SG Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 if the credit entity asks the company to 
present for guarantees for the loan; otherwise its value is 0. 
COM Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 if the credit entity asks the company to 
present some form of additional compensation that is not a guarantee; otherwise its 
value is 0. 
GP Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 if the guarantees requested are lower than, or 
equal to, 100% of the loan, and 0 if the level of guarantees requested exceeds 100% 
of the loan. 
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Table VIII: Explanatory variables 
VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKING RELATIONSHIP 
NRB Number of banking relationships, measured as ln(1+number of banking relationships). 
DUR_12 Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 if the age of the relationship between the 
company and its main creditor with which it works is 1 to 2 years; otherwise its value 
is 0. 
DUR_35 Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 if the age of the relationship between the 
company and its main creditor with which it works is 3 to 5 years; otherwise its value 
is 0. 
DUR_610 Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 if the age of the relationship between the 
company and its main creditor with which it works is 6 to 10 years; otherwise its value 
is 0. 
DUR_+10 Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 if the age of the relationship between the 
company and its main creditor with which it works is more than 10 years; otherwise its 
value is 0. 
PMD Variable that reflects the maximum percentage of financing concentrated with a single 
credit entity. 
RE_CC Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 when the company maintains a relationship 
with its main creditor through the maintenance of a current account; otherwise its 
value is 0. 
RE_CA Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 when the company maintains a relationship 
with its main creditor through the maintenance of a savings account; otherwise its 
value is 0. 
RE_DN Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 when the company maintains a relationship 
with its main creditor through direct debiting of its payroll; otherwise its value is. 
RE_DC Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 when the company maintains a relationship 
with the main entity through documents discounts; otherwise its this value is 0. 
RE_CS Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 when the company maintains a relationship 
with the main financial entity because the credit entity has a share participation in the 
company; otherwise its value is 0. 
RE_LC Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 when the company maintains a relationship 
with the main financial entity through the maintenance of a savings account; otherwise 
its value is 0. 
AMPLITUD This is the sum of the above mentioned dichotomic variables representing aspects of 
the type of relationship that the company maintains with its main creditor. 
FID Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 if the company always operates with the 
same credit entity when performing banking operations; otherwise its value is 0. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
TAM This measures the size of the company according to the number of employees. 
AGE Measured as ln (age from which the company began to develop its main activity). 
EFIC This measures the efficiency of asset usage and rotation as volume of sales with 
respect to total assets. 
FINPROP This reflects the financial structure of the company, measured as the percentage of 
own or internal financing with respect to total liabilities. 
EMPFAMI Dichotomic variable equal to the value 1 if the company is family owned; otherwise its 
value is 0. 
 
  
Since the variables used to align credit rationing are both continual (cost and 
volume) and dichotomic (term and guarantees), the models proposed were the 
ordinary least squares regression models, but robust for the former and maximum 
likelihood estimations associated with the Probit Model for latter. Heteroscedasticity 
controls associated with the independent variables were also performed, but no 
problems of this type were detected12. 
                                                          
12 The correlation matrix, which is not presented in the study, did not reflect any significant correlation 
above 0.5. 
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 5. RESULTS 
 
Tables IX and X present the results of the models estimated for the different forms 
of credit rationing described previously. Thus, Table IX presents the study of 
quantity rationing, cost or price rationing, and long-term credit rationing; and Table 
X presents the determinants of rationing associated with collateral requirements 
and other additional compensation. 
 
A. Rationing of the amount of credit or credit availability 
 
We measured quantity rationing (rationing of the amount of credit) according to the 
amount of financing received by the company from all credit entities13 (FEDC) as a 
percentage of total liabilities. Table IX presents the main results obtained from this 
estimation. 
 
As regards the characteristics of the banking relationships, we discovered that 
enterprises working with larger numbers of financial entities (NRB) achieved better 
access to bank financing, since they obtained a larger proportion of funds from the 
same financial institution. However, the fact that debt was more concentrated 
(PMD) with a single creditor did not seem to be relevant in terms of improving 
access to bank financing. This coincides with the findings described previously. The 
duration of the banking relationship (DUR) also had a positive effect insofar as it 
fostered greater access to bank financing. We also observed a positive incremental 
effect in this regard as the duration of relationships increased (from DUR_2 to 
DUR_+10).  
 
The presentation of guarantees (SG) enables companies to access larger amounts 
of bank financing; however, the scope of the banking relationship (measure of the 
number of services that the entity renders to the company) did not have a 
significant effect.  
 
When analysing other variables outside the scope of the banking relationship, it 
seems that companies that display greatest efficiency in the use of assets (EFIC) 
and the most mature enterprises present lower percentages of financing from credit 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
13 This datum was constructed by adding the percentages of financing that companies maintained with 
banks (both national and foreign) and with savings banks, as available and broken down in the 
questionnaire. 
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entities, possibly because own or internal financing is a priority for these 
companies. It is also interesting to note that the duration of the banking 
relationship had a relevant impact on credit accessibility but this was not observed 
in the case of the age of the company.  
 
B. Price rationing 
 
Price rationing refers to the fact that although SMEs may obtain access to bank 
debt, the conditions in terms of the costs of credit are unfavourable because the 
interest rates that they are forced to pay are higher than market rates. We used 
short and long-term cost measurements to measure price rationing. 
 
In terms of both short and long-term financing costs, the variables relating to the 
number of entities with which enterprises worked and the duration of their 
relationships did no have any significant effects. Additionally, despite verifying 
beforehand that the scope of banking relationships was not significant for 
determining access to bank financing, the fact that companies maintained another 
kind of relationship with the financial institution did seem to be relevant, since this 
helped them to achieve reductions in costs. Companies managed to obtain 
reductions in short-term interest costs through direct crediting/debiting of salary 
payments. They also achieved reductions in long-term interest payable when lines 
of credit were established and when the bank in question had a shareholding in the 
company14. 
 
In terms of requests for guarantees, it seems that whenever financial institutions 
request guarantees from companies this is accompanied by greater rationing, since 
they also require these enterprises to pay higher short and long-term interest. 
Therefore, these results suggest that even if companies manage to obtain financing 
from banks, they must bear higher costs and also present more collateral. 
 
As regards the results associated with the control variables, we discovered that 
more mature companies managed to reduce not only the cost of short-term 
financing, but also its long-term costs. Furthermore, companies that used higher 
proportions of own or internal financing faced long-term price rationing, perhaps 
due to the more limited information available to the credit market on these 
companies. With regard to sectorial controls, the short-term financing costs borne 
                                                          
14 In the estimation of the model we included the other dichotomic variables that reflected the different 
types of relationships maintained by SMEs with financial entities, but those that were not significant have 
been excluded from Tables VI and VII. 
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by companies from the wholesale sector were lower than those of companies in 
industry, retail, construction and services, which enjoyed lower long-term costs 
with respect to the costs payable by companies in the primary sector15. 
 
C. Long-term credit rationing 
 
Another type of rationing is long-term credit rationing; this is financing that is 
awarded but with a shorter repayment term than that requested. Column (4) in 
Table IX shows the determinants of banking relationships in long-term credit 
rationing. In order to study these determinants, we constructed dummy variable 
DFLP; this variable was equal to value 1 when long-term financing is greater than 
short-term financing; otherwise, its value was 0. We used the maximum likelihood 
method to estimate the Probit Model proposed on more probable conditioning 
factors of access to more long-term financing that would subsequently lead to a 
reduction of long-term credit rationing. 
 
The results presented in column (4) reveal the significant influence of banking 
relationships on long-term credit rationing. Thus, we noted that companies that 
maintained longer relationships with credit entities had better access to long-term 
financing, and the incremental effect of this variable was positive and significant. 
When we compared these results with the coefficient used to measure the overall 
age of the SME, we discovered that it was not this variable but rather the duration 
of the banking relationship that increased the probability of access to long-term 
financing. The number of financial entities with which the company worked was not 
significant with regard to the credit term. As regards the types of relationships 
established with credit entities, we noted that companies establishing relationships 
through the maintenance of savings accounts and lines of credit were more likely to 
access shorter-term financing; this is not unusual because the types of financial 
instruments deriving from these relationships are short term. Another interesting 
finding was that SMEs in which credit entities had shareholdings were more likely to 
obtain long-term financing. Once again, the share participation of banks in SMEs 
seems to provide better conditions for access to financing. This may be due to the 
presence of venture capital companies that support SMEs and have stakes in the 
capital of these companies. Hence, the variable that reflects the relationship with 
the credit entity through its participation in the firm’s capital may reflect this trend, 
                                                          
15 The sectorial dummies do not appear in the tables, although these were included in the model to make it 
easier to understand. 
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since it is to be expected that credit entities participate more in larger companies 
than in SMEs. 
 
However, companies that concentrate a high percentage of their debt with a single 
entity (PMD) have fewer possibilities of obtaining long-term financing, since credit 
entities are more exposed to the higher level of risk of companies with these 
characteristics. 
 
As regards the other control variables, the results show that larger companies are 
more likely to obtain more long-term financing because they present fewer 
asymmetries.  In terms of the sectorial controls, companies operating in the 
wholesale sector are less likely to obtain long-term financing, which suggests that 
these companies may be affected by long-term credit rationing; however, as 
explained earlier, these companies are not subjected to price rationing, at least in 
the short term. 
 
D. Rationing in compensation and collateral requirements 
 
The existence of rationing in guarantees and compensation means that SMEs 
managing to access bank financing are required to present very stringent 
guarantees as compensation. We used various proxies to reflect this situation. In 
the literature, the most common proxy is the dummy variable, which reflects the 
request (or non-request) for guarantees that must be presented as collateral (SG). 
But in addition to this variable, we included another series of variables designed to 
complement the dummy variable. These variables were: the ratio between 
guarantees requested and the amount of credit awarded (RGP); and the inclusion in 
the contract of other types of additional compensation (COM) such as the direct 
crediting/debiting of salary payments, openings of current and savings accounts or 
other types of services rendered by the entity. 
 
Since the explanatory variables were dichotomic in all three cases, we used the 
maximum likelihood method to estimate the Probit Models proposed for each 
variable; the results are shown in Table X.  
 
The results presented in column (1) show that the request for guarantees was not 
significantly affected by the variables associated with the banking relationship, such 
as the number of entities with which the company works and the duration of the 
relationship. However, we observed that companies maintaining relationships with 
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entities by contracting certain services (direct crediting/debiting of salary payments 
or savings accounts) were less likely to be asked to present guarantees. However, if 
the financial entity owned a stake in the company, the likelihood of guarantees 
being requested increased. These situations may have arisen when venture capital 
companies were involved; despite offering more favourable credit access 
conditions, these types of companies try to cover the risks that they assume by 
guaranteeing awarded credits. We also noted that family-owned companies, which 
presented higher concentrations of risks, were more likely to be asked to present 
guarantees. 
 
As regards the control variables, we discovered that SMEs with more solvent 
financial structures and higher levels of asset rotation emitted positive signals to 
the credit market, thus reducing the likelihood of being asked to present 
guarantees. 
 
We used two further models - presented below – in order to complete our analysis 
of collateral requirements/guarantee requests. Column (2) identifies the 
determinants of the total amount of guarantees in relation to the loan (DRGP) and 
not simply the fact that these guarantees were requested. We also determined 
whether it was likely that the company also needed a different type of 
compensation to the guarantees (COM), i.e. by contracting a series of additional 
services that could also be treated as a form of rationing. 
 
Companies that maintained longer relationships with credit entities were less likely 
to be asked for compensation, although it was also probable that they would be 
asked to present collateral superior to the value of the loan. In these cases the 
duration of the relationship, which was favourable in terms of other accessibility 
conditions and credit prices, was compensated by a reduction of risk through the 
requirement of a greater volume of guarantees. However, loyalty in the banking 
relationship was accompanied by a lower level of demand for guarantees; this can 
be explained by the fact that the entity receives that differential effect through 
other services.  
 
The demand for guarantees above the value of the loan are associated with a 
greater probability of compensation, which indicates that these are complementary 
and not substitute mechanisms. 
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The rationing of the credit in the demand for guarantees to be presented by SMEs is 
reflected in the fact that for the global sample of SMEs we noted that guarantees 
requested (SG) were greater than 100% of the value of the loan. 
 
As regards the other control variables, it seems that larger companies and less 
solvent enterprises are more likely to be asked for additional compensation. 
Moreover, the likelihood that they are asked for additional compensation and that 
the percentage of guarantees with respect to the total amount of credit is greater 
than 100% was greater for companies with higher levels of asset rotation. This 
shows that the credit market tries to cover itself against risks by rendering other 
services and imposing guarantee requirements, albeit not in terms of cost. 
 
Table IX: Determinants of quantity, price and long-term credit rationing 
 Quantity rationing 
(FEDC) 
OLS estimation (1) 
Price rationing 
     COSTECP           COSTELP 
OLS estimation 
          (2)                      (3) 
Long-term credit 
rationing 
(TERM) 
MLE estimation (4) 
TAM .006364 (0.13) -.0055074 (-0.87) -.0011485 (-0.16) .0071456** (2.38) 
NRB 952099** (2.29) .5020608 (0.63) .126213 (0.13) .0142578 (0.04) 
DUR_12 5.170062 (0.63) -3.046645 (-1.17) -2.034336 (-1.05) 2.116035*** (2.72) 
DUR_35 1.285496* (1.70) .8305425 (0.46) .9839736 (0.62) 1.806008*** (2.91) 
DUR_610 1.929181** (2.57) 2.108011 (1.11) -.3407826 (-0.20) 1.391494** (2.41) 
DUR_+10 2.144708*** (2.97) 3.158516 (1.62) 1.849328 (0.98) 2.045136*** (3.24) 
EFIC -.0042853*** (-6.12) -.0001721 (-0.76) .1079237 (1.64) .0000251 (0.32) 
EDAD -4.962439** (-2.39) -1.003923** (-2.30) -.4967271 (-1.19) -.5755908*** (-3.08) 
AMPLITUD -.2027631 (-0.18)    
RE_CA  1.110389 (1.32) 1.324792 (1.36) -.7867924** (-2.19) 
RE_CS 
 -2.177432 
(-1.26) 
-1.713193** 
(-2.05) 
1.064334** 
(2.07) 
RE_DN 
 -1.160694* 
(-1.73) 
-.8810745 
(-1.21) 
.127286 
(0.41) 
RE_LC 
 -.2578537 
(-0.26) 
-1.529175* 
(-1.73) 
-.9349545*** 
(-3.02) 
PMD 
.0396089 
(0.61) 
-.0029729 
(-0.24) 
.0028073 
0.18) 
-.00938* 
(-1.83) 
SG 
1.156023*** 
(2.80) 
2.169995*** 
(3.24) 
3.239764*** 
(3.52) 
.4830854 
(1.53) 
FINPROP 
 -.0170755 
(-1.05) 
.0294943* 
(1.79) 
.0074185 
(1.49) 
FID 
 .1477965 
(0.23) 
-1.025388 
(-1.00) 
.0818391 
(0.27) 
Constant 
1.462222 
(0.93) 
9.660876*** 
(2.96) 
7.009987** 
(2.49) 
.6257136 
(0.58) 
No.  Obs. 197 81 81 128 
F (p-value) 23.29 
(0.00) 
6.03 
(0.00) 
5.34 
(0.00)  
R2 0.14 0.496 0.47  
Chi2 (p-value)  
  
87.92 
(0.00) 
Pseudo R2    0.3034 
Level of significance: *** at 99%, ** at 95% and * at 90% 
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Table X: Determinants of guarantees and additional compensation 
 Guarantees requested (MLE 
estimation) 
 
(1) 
Guarantees-loan ratio (MLE 
estimation) 
(2) 
Compensation requested 
(MLE estimation) 
(3) 
TAM 
-.0066529 
(-1.32) 
-.0038587 
(-1.09) 
.0072044*** 
(2.60) 
NRB 
-.2264061 
(-0.55) 
.0591335 
(0.15) 
-.1359545 
(-0.55) 
DUR_12 
.3659787 
(0.41) 
-.7859029 
(-0.97) 
.5322727 
(0.79) 
DUR_35 
.849252 
(1.10) 
-1.112109 
(-1.53) 
-.6197413 
(-1.19) 
DUR_610 
.55427 
(0.71) 
-1.488291** 
(-2.13) 
-.4367202 
(-0.85) 
DUR_+10 
.8067548 
(1.04) 
-.5582711 
(-0.81) 
-1.023286** 
(-1.98) 
EFIC 
-.055452* 
(-1.74) 
-.0002263** 
(-2.57) 
.0002994*** 
(3.34) 
EDAD 
-.21025 
(-0.98) 
.1042382 
(0.51) 
-.065055 
(-0.46) 
AMPLITUD  
-.0664602 
(-0.54) 
 
RE_CA 
-1.216508** 
(-2.16) 
  
RE_CS 
144423** 
(2.36) 
  
RE_DN 
-.854122** 
(-1.98) 
  
RE_LC 
.6754835 
(1.37) 
  
OTHER 
-.3136277 
(-0.63) 
  
PMD 
.0089837 
(1.23) 
.0062114 
(0.99) 
 
FINPROP 
-.0143956* 
(-1.87) 
-.0018253 
(-0.32) 
-.0103957** 
(-2.44) 
EMPFAMI 
1.273668*** 
(3.42) 
  
RGP  
 -.5873368*** 
(-2.60) 
SG  
-2.684537*** 
(-4.84) 
 
FID  
.8742071** 
(2.46) 
 
Constant 
.2889378 
(0.23) 
3.618088*** 
(2.72) 
1.833607** 
(2.07) 
No. Observations 86 97 151 
Chi2 (p-value) 48.93 
(0.00) 
64.68 
(0.00) 
47.76 
(0.00) 
Pseudo R2 0.3726 0.23 0.1485 
Level of significance: *** at 99%, ** at 95% and * at 90% 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Previous studies on credit rationing and the development of bank relationships to 
eliminate or reduce this type of rationing have basically focused on price and 
quantity rationing, and at the same time have considered debt terms and 
conditions with respect to guarantee requests. This paper also studies the effects 
on compensation demanded in return for debt and the effect of the development of 
banking relationships with long-term credit rationing. 
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In the case of the quantity rationing (rationing of the amount of credit) or credit 
availability, the main results confirmed that companies working with a larger 
number of financial entities and with longer banking relationships had more 
possibilities of accessing credit. 
 
As regards the effect of banking relationships on price rationing, the variables 
relating to the number of financial entities with which companies work and the 
durations of these relationships did not have a significant impact on this effect. 
However, it is relevant that SMEs maintain other types of relationships with 
financial institutions since this helps them to achieve reductions in credit costs. 
 
With respect to long-term credit rationing, we noted that SMEs that had established 
longer relationships with credit entities enjoyed better accessibility to long-term 
financing, and the incremental effect of this variable was positive and significant. 
When comparing these results with the coefficient measuring the overall age of the 
SME, we discovered that companies were not more likely to access long-term 
financing due to this variable but rather because of the duration of their banking 
relationship. The number of financial entities with which a company works did not 
have a significant impact on the term of credit. As far as the types of relations 
established with credit entities are concerned, it was noted that if the relationship 
was based on the maintenance of savings account and lines of credit, the company 
was more likely to have access to shorter-term financing.  
 
In terms of rationing in compensation and guarantees requested, companies that 
establish relationships with credit entities based on the rendering of specific 
services (direct crediting/debiting of salary payments or savings accounts) are 
more likely to be asked to present fewer guarantees. However, the likelihood of 
guarantees being requested is higher if the credit entity has a shareholding in the 
company. 
 
In order to complete the study of the credit market, we decided to study the credit 
market from the standpoint of suppliers or providers. It is to be expected that the 
perception that credit entities have of the importance of banking relationships and 
of the mediation of RGCs would be different, as factors for generating information 
and reducing risk, respectively. Since Savings Banks are the main providers of 
funds, it would be interesting to determine the destination of SME investments. 
There may be a certain degree of asymmetry in the relationships between these 
enterprises and financial institutions, depending on whether the operations are 
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asset or liability based. On this basis, it is to be expected that investments are 
performed with commercial banks (whose credit investment would go to large 
companies) and the credits would be received. 
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